Stepan Piligian
Armenia has voted. The people have spoken. Well, about half of Armenia has. Turnout was disappointing—slightly over 50-percent. With so much on the line, one would assume that perhaps a strong majority would participate. Regardless, the snap election is over. What’s next? Once the formal certification of the election by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) is completed (within seven days), Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract Party will be asked to form a government. The results indicate that his party will hold 71 seats (called mandates) and the party placing second, Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance, will hold 29 seats. The I Have Honor alliance will hold seven seats even though they did not make the seven percent threshold required for alliances. Their performance is superseded by Armenian law that requires at least three parties/alliances to be seated in the National Assembly. While that process is unfolding, the Armenia Alliance will formally challenge the results of the election in the Constitutional Court. This has become almost tradition in Armenian politics for the loser of the election to challenge its legitimacy. Personally, I will take a court challenge, which is their legal right, over street protests (which is also their right but often leads to violence). Despite the wide margin of victory (53 percent to 21 percent), the contentious nature of the election almost guaranteed a protest by one party. In the meantime, congratulatory messages from other nations are starting to flow as the election takes on reality. European observers issued a preliminary statement that the election was “competitive and generally very well-managed during a short time frame.” The 330 European observers were under the auspices of the OSCE (yes, the same group that has tolerated Azeri non-compliance to the peace effort for 30 years). The vast majority of their work consists of visiting polling sites to observe the integrity of the voting process. Fraud, of course, usually takes place prior to the election with bribes and pressure on the electorate by certain interest groups. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to rationalize the sizable gap in the results to illegal activity.
Armenian citizens were faced with a very difficult choice during this election. Despite the large number of party participants, the choice was essentially between giving Pashinyan and his questionable performance a second chance versus returning to the past with Kocharyan. I’d like to share my observations on the polls which showed a close race in the mid twenties for both Pashinyan and Kocharyan. The prediction for Kocharyan was actually fairly accurate given the results. It is obvious that the prediction for Pashinyan was grossly understated either because the respondents were uncomfortable stating their true preference or the polling was flawed in its design. The significance of the gap suggests that, at a minimum, many supporters of Pashinyan did not wish to disclose their preference publicly. Clearly, Armenian voters believed that giving Pashinyan a chance at redemption was the best option. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), a partner in the Armenia Alliance, stands to receive at least one-third of the 29 mandates. This would be their strongest parliamentary presence, albeit in opposition, since 2007. Although their goal was to participate in the sitting government, it will be the first time they have sat in the National Assembly since 2018. If the minimum objective of the ARF in joining the Armenia Alliance was to regain a presence in the National Assembly, then they can spin it as a success.
Assuming this all takes a few weeks to sort out, what is or should be the direction of the country? Obviously, since Armenia’s defeat in the Artsakh War, Pashinyan has altered his pro-Western tilt to a very mindful tone of compliance with Russia. The most important question for Armenians to ask themselves is: “How do we define our sovereignty?”
Since 1991, Russian troops have guarded the border with Turkey as part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Now they control the Artsakh/Azeri border, and they recently announced they will participate in the Gegharkunik region of Lake Sevan. Economically, most of the main industries and infrastructure were sold off to Russian interests many years ago. Now we suffer the indignity of Azeris further violating our borders in several locations. POWs are incarcerated illegally, tortured while international authorities are ignored. Is this how we define sovereignty? If so, then our definition is synonymous with a vassal state. We have a veneer of international relations but very little independent thinking, particularly since the 44-day war. This is the current Pashinyan legacy—a wounded nation led down the path of defeat. His populist victory in the Velvet Revolution has been overshadowed; he’s now the man who presided over the incredible loss of parts of Artsakh that included the unimaginable and painful expense of young Armenian soldiers. If his tenure the next few years is anything like the nearly eight months since the end of the war, we are in for an even more difficult period.
The most pressing needs of the country in the short term are border control, the refugee crisis and economic recovery. There is no room for the old Pashinyan approach which led to this calamity. I am urging for what we will call “patriotic unity.” It is time for all factions to subordinate their self-interests of power and control to work only in the interests of Armenia’s survival. While it might sound idealistic and naïve, it’s not.
Let’s start with inter-party relationships in Armenian political life. If each faction labels the other criminals and traitors, then there is not much of a foundation for working together. Public name calling only serves to incite a base and create an atmosphere of continued conflicts. There is a significant difference between open political warfare and simply disagreeing with civil debate. The latter is a cornerstone of democracy. That choice is very clear today in Armenia and Artsakh, because it is illustrated by a foreign reality rather than a domestic issue. We just lost a war against an alliance between Turkey (modern NATO weaponry) and Azerbaijan (ramped up military spending over the last five years) that revitalized the pan-Turkic strategy of uniting Turkic peoples at Armenia’s expense. Bloodthirsty Azeris seeking to capitalize on a weakened Armenia violated the borders openly, and we entered into “negotiations.” Aside from the northern border with Georgia and a much-reduced common border with Iran (after the loss of Hadrut), Armenia is surrounded by Azeris and Turks. Artsakh has been reduced to less than the NKR oblast of pre-1991 and is completely engulfed by violent, hostile and criminal Azeris. If this is not a formula requiring immediate unity, then we will never experience it. In my view, we have not experienced such threats since the Turkish army rolled towards Armenia from the west in May 1918. The CSTO defense treaty (supposedly Armenia’s NATO) has proven ineffective as Armenia’s sovereign, internationally recognized borders are violated by rogue Azeris. If our infighting continues to impact our capabilities, then our sovereignty will be lost, and we will be remembered as the generation that squandered Armenia’s miracle.
A Pashinyan supporter displays a hammer at Monday’s victory rally in Republic Square. On the campaign trail, Pashinyan called to replace his velvet mandate with a steel one. “If Pashinyan views his victory as a ‘mandate’ and ignores the need to reach out, he is making a huge blunder,” writes Stepan Piligian.
The responsibility of “patriotic unity” starts with the government. It must be reflected in policy and behavior and not simply in press statements. That starts now. If Pashinyan views his victory as a “mandate” and ignores the need to reach out, he is making a huge blunder. Nearly 50-percent of the electorate did not bother to vote. If a “good” turnout is considered 75-percent, that means that additionally one out of four Armenian voters did not bother either because they don’t care or have lost hope. This is reminiscent of the pre-Velvet times when hope and the will to fight for democracy were low. Pashinyan would be wise to diversify his cabinet and governors with individuals recognized as not being Civil Contract loyalists. He has made this task more difficult for himself by having an adversarial relationship with Serzh Sargsyan, Gagik Tsarukyan and the legal proceedings against Kocharyan. Despite these conflicts, all of these men are politicians or have at least chosen to be in this environment. Agreeing to a cooperative deal is something they do regularly. Can they do it for Armenia and Artsakh’s future?
Power is only useful if there is a nation to lead.
This initiative will have a higher probability of success if initiated by Pashinyan. He needs to be the leader he has been elected to be and “unite” the country. The next Minister of Foreign Affairs must be respected by Russia but strong enough to work in Armenia’s interest. Is it unrealistic that this be someone from Kocharyan’s camp? Power is only useful if there is a nation to lead. This strategy must go beyond political adversaries. The walls with the diaspora must be legislatively torn down to enable Armenians from the diaspora to serve the Republic with revisions to citizenship and residency requirements. This is another element of “unity” required to optimize Armenia’s capability. With the country’s future on the line, all the assets must be deployed. Whether it is the underutilization of the diaspora or the sidelining of the political opposition, engagement must start with the signal given by the Pashinyan government. If not patriotism, then he has another motivation. Pashinyan has a rare opportunity for political redemption. With mistakes of this magnitude, it is not often that a leader stays in office long enough to preside over recovery. He has been given that opportunity, but only if he is wise enough to use all of the resources at his disposal. There are two kinds of CEOs. The first talks about openness and diversity, but really wants only people who agree with him/her. The second values different thoughts and skills to bring a better solution to the table. The latter is a more challenging management environment, but has the potential for much better performance. What binds the group together is a common vision. Have we really reached the point where our self-interests are greater than protecting a free and sovereign Armenia? The next several months will answer this question. It is time for all of us to understand that “taking for granted” is our current reality and serious adjustments are required to ensure a future.
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