Richard Griagosian is the employee of Joint Economic Committee of the U. S. Congress. Our compatriot is a specialist of political, economic and military issues of the CIS countries, the Middle East, Asia and China. He is the analyst of the London based “Jane’s Information Group” Center.
– Let’s begin our interview on the last parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan. Few months ago, the USA kept reminding Azerbaijan that the elections may turn out to be serious challenge for Ilham Aliyev, if they are falsified. The elections were falsified, while Washington doesn’t criticize Baku.
– If we look closely at the elections in Azerbaijan, first, lets go back several months, as you do in your question. We see that last summer the American government was revising or rethinking its policy towards Baku. This, in fact, is a long process related to all the revolutions of fruit and flowers- Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, but also less of Uzbekistan and the danger of relying on the leadership of government like Karimov in Uzbekistan. So that from the U.S. point of view, its important that the democracy in Azerbaijan is more in the institutions not individuals. So that now we see Azerbaijan and Washington both have a misunderstanding of each other. There is a miscalculation on both sides, because Washington in many ways believes that is still his friend. All he needs is a little push and pressure to become more democratic. But the real facts are quite on the contrary. Aliyev interprets the push and pressure from the Americans as putting in the other direction- improving relations with Moscow, looking more away from NATO and less looking to the United States, especially now that he has the oil pipeline. The other important fact is that in the beginning the pre-election violence, the pre-election campaign was very disappointing for Washington, they think that Ilham Aliyev went too far, too fast. But interestingly, when Rasul Guliev tried to return to Azerbaijan, Aliyev, in my opinion, used it as a pretext justification to move against other clan elements in Baku. But in an American prospective he also went too far, he did too much. And in many ways the problem is that it was more a position of weakness then strength. In other words, what Aliyev did, was much more from a position of weakness and illegitimacy than from strength. However, the real important test in my opinion for both America and Azerbaijan the real test was not really the election, but is now how they are going to handle post-election. In other words, will Azerbaijan, the Aliyev regime overreact to the opposition, to the demonstrations. That will be real failure of the test, because the real problem of the Azerbaijani regime is illegitimacy, where its power by genetics, not politics, it is inherited in Aliyev dynasty. And in fact if we look at Azerbaijani politics, up until Ilham Aliyev, every leader of Azerbaijan came to power by either coup d’etat or by threatening coup d’etat, march in on Baku. And in fact, last free and fair election in Azerbaijan was held long ago. This is significant too, because the American disappointment towards Azerbaijani elections will also be limited. In other words, Aliyev has one lesson from Uzbekistan, from Karimov. He evicted the Americans. We can improve our relationship with Moscow, because the Americans need us, we have the leverage over the Americans. The other lesson for Aliyev is actually from Egypt, because the Mubarak election was the first test for Americans promoting democracy abroad. Mubarak for the first time allowed an opposition candidate run against him. But it is still a fake election, but the American response to Egypt was only to highlight the progress made in democracy. Aliyev was expecting the same response from the Americans and he disappointed. If we look at the longer term trend for Armenia, it is interesting, because U. S.- Georgian relations are also bad right now, U.S.- Azerbaijan relations are also complicated and troubling, so this means Armenia is emerging as the only stable country in the region which is the very important dynamic, because its evolution, not revolution, stability and security that America wants now not necessarily the rather CNN-affect revolutions, because the results in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and even in Ukraine, the results were not exactly what the American hopeful, or wanted. And that is why there was much more cautious U. S policy.
– After inheriting the power from his late father two years ago, Ilham Aliyev for 6 times visited Moscow, but paid not a single one to Washington. And according to Azeri media, the Americans don’t want to receive him. Have Americans any intention to bent Ilham Aliyev in a Euro-Atlantic, American way?
– Let’s look at it in several ways. First, in a much more limited view, the problem in Azerbaijan for the U. S. is a similar problem in Armenia. There is no one in the opposition who is judged capable or competed, there is no viable opposition candidate in either country from the American prospective, so that severely limits American options. In a broader picture, we see as I said, last summer U. S. was rethinking it’s strategy toward Azerbaijan and that is why where was a decision when Aliyev wanted to come, to visit the White House last summer. The American answer was you can come to Washington but not on a state visit, and you will never be allowed in the White House now. The second thing was the ceremony marking the beginning Baku-Jeyhan. Secretary Condolizza Rice was supposed to come but canceled, and instead much, much lower official to sending message to Baku. Now the bigger picture: if we step back even further in the most significant trend in Azerbaijan, is the relationship between Moscow and Baku which is improving, also the military agreement between Baku and Moscow for spare parts and technical cooperation which also Armenia should be concerned with, because the main reflect, a larger danger of Russia changing its position in Nagorno Karabakh, which is interesting.
– Ilham Aliyev or Safar Abiev very usually claim that Azerbaijan is ready to liberate Karabakh and the surrounding territories if the peaceful means do not yield any results. What do you think, in which state the Azeri military is?
– If we look at the state, the condition of Azerbaijani military, as an analyst I will argue that the Azerbaijani military is even worse than Armenian’s. Mainly because if we look closely, we’ll see that Defence Minister Safar Abiev, is the longest serving Defence Minister in all the former Soviet Union, for one reason, corruption. He is in that position for loyalty, not military competence or quality, because the Defence Ministry is one of the main vehicles for corruption in Azerbaijan. And for years, despite the rhetoric, the Azerbaijani military was kept underfunded, was kept poor with inadequate living conditions, inadequate equipment for morale results. The reason was, because under Heidar Aliyev there was a recognition that the only threat to his power came from the military, nowhere else.
Now there are two dangers, actually. First, every time the militant language, threats, rhetoric used in Azerbaijan, it is leading to frustration, unhappiness within the officer corps, within the Azerbaijani military who are frustrated with the poor state of their military but are more frustrated by not the threats of force against Karabakh, but by the lack of action, another words- the empty-words of Aliyev and the others. So, that may be an interesting element, where the Azerbaijani military get so unhappy and frustrated by the rhetoric and not the action that they actually either turn outward and launch their own attack and say “We are not afraid, we are going to do it this time or they turn inwards and say we go march on Baku ourselves like Surat Hussainov. The second danger is that the weak Azerbaijani army is a much more serious threat to Armenia, than a professional military. I now that this is unpopular and provocative but I do believe that the U.S. training of the Azerbaijani military is actually good for Armenia. And let me explain. The Americans are concentrating on professionalizing the Azerbaijani military as well as proliferation, security in the Caspian, but it is good because, the reforms that the Americans are imposing on the Azerbaijani military and the neutrality, professionalism also make them much more stable and predictable which is important for the Armenian military. It is important, because allows the Americans keep closer eyes on the Azerbaijani military. The threat of conflict over Karabakh is one side, it comes from Azerbaijan, there is no danger of Armenia or Nagorno Karabakh invading Azerbaijan or marching on Baku, it is ridiculous. And that is why I would argue what the Americans are doing in Azerbaijan also serves Armenia’s interest and regional security. And if we also look on the Armenian military, I would argue strongly – a strong, capable Armenian military is good for the region, it is good for balance of power and for regional security, because two things worry me. One is not the American military in the region, because for the first time in history the American military is in the Central Asia and in Caucasus – in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and deepening ties with Armenia. That does not worry me, what worries me about the American military presence, if after they leave, when there is some vacuum created and, if the Armenian army is not sufficiently self-sufficient, strong enough, then there will be a danger. The second worry I have is that Armenia is in an great danger of becoming more of a Russian garrison state, depending on Russia too much, lost a balance of complementarity and the trajectory of the Azerbaijani military over time is greater. In other words, we have more of a temporary military advantage. If we look at the defense spending in Azerbaijan, which has recently increased, we see that, in my opinion, it is not the amount of money that is important, it is actually how the money is spent and where it goes. That is the most important. But again, our overdependence on Russia, and in military terms our overdependence on following the Russian model, look at in Chechnya, Beslan, Nalchik, Nord-Ost, is that the military we want to worship? It’s a little bit dangerous.
– Do you believe Safar Abiyev can be a real threat for Aliyev regime?
– No. Aliyev senior was very canning, he believed that the only possible threat to his power come from a strong military. So he kept Abiyev and made sure that the military would remain weak. A new Defence Minister and the stronger Azerbaijani military that is also a threat to the regime in Baku. And again, in some ways possibly a good thing for Armenia, again a strong military in Azerbaijan and civil military relation may also lead to good reforms in Baku because if we look at Nagorno Karabakh conflict, frankly, in my opinion I am not worried about the peace process, I am not even worried about the peace agreement, I am worried about the day after the peace agreement, I am worried about the post-conflict security, because the Azerbaijani strategy may very well be waiting five or ten years and then when it strong enough to retake Azerbaijan. So, therefore, two thinks are important for Armenia and Karabakh, one is the security guarantees: the buffer zone, demilitarized, etc. The second thing is we have to make sure and help contribute to that within five or ten years Azerbaijan will not be the same Azerbaijan and that will no longer be in their interest five or ten years from now to even want Nagorno Karabakh back.
– Can Kosovo become a precedent for Nagorno Karabakh conflict solution? Armenian authorities claim that Nagorno Karabakh will never be part of independent Azerbaijan. Five or ten years from now, do you believe that an Azerbaijani leader will have a courage to put his signature under the document recognizing Karabakh as out of Azerbaijan’s structure?
– Like Kosovo, and unlike Javakhk, which actually still has a future in Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh, in every serious analyst’s opinion, knows that there is no future of returning to Azerbaijan. There is no future mainly also, because of Sumgait, Kirovabad and Baku. In other words, there is too much of a history, where Azerbaijani side has proven itself to be incapable of taking Nagorno Karabakh and protecting it within Azerbaijan. It is unrealistic at best. The other important thing is that I do believe that the best future for Nagorno Karabakh is not independence, because it is not self-sufficient enough, it would be too vulnerable. I believe Karabakh’s future is actually within Armenia- as a separate Marz but with greater powers. Even from a military point of view, it is easier that way. Its more capable to defend. However, Armenia has to understand that Azerbaijan has to gain something. It has to gain the occupied territories except for Lachin. And when I say occupied territories, I say on purpose and not liberated territories, because I do believe that they were seized as margining chips and also as demilitarized buffer, security zone. That is why it is more important to me not to keep them or to settle them, it is more important to make sure that their future is part of Azerbaijan, but demilitarized.
– As for Armenia, what do you think how well this country is ruled?
– On one hand, the one goal for the all the outside powers, including Russia, U.S. and Europe, is now stability, stable partner, even more than democracy in the short term. Now, what is also important is that what Armenia offers is also under agenda, because Armenia offers not just stability, but the opportunity to institutionalize democracy, institutions not individuals.
Actually, Armenia has made more progress than Georgia and Azerbaijan. In fact, Azerbaijan is going in the other direction, it is resembling more of the Central Asian states. Armenia’s evolution to democracy is the preferred path.
One of the problems of Armenia politically is that the system is so closed, very closed. The ruling elites, the oligarchs it is very closed system and even the young people who enter the political system, become either corrupt, become dirty and that is the price of admission. The largest threat to Armenian national security, which is not Azerbaijan, not Turkey from within, the biggest threat to national securities’ corruption, and it is internal.
– On one hand, Armenia is Russia’s military partner in the South Caucasus, but on the other, Yerevan claims that it is going to deepen its ties with EU, NATO, U.S. Don’t you see contradiction, and don’t you think that the time will come and the Russians will say: “Isn’t it enough?”
– I see just the opposite. The U.S. and Russia have strategic partnership, Armenia does not have partnership with Russia, Armenia is much more Russia’s platform than partner. Armenia’s mistake in this context is Armenia tends to overestimate Russia’s strategic value to Armenia, while at the same time Armenia underestimates it’s strategic value to Russia. Russia needs Armenia a lot more, than Armenia realizes. At the same time, Armenia overestimates Russia’s importance to Armenia. Let’s look at the military base. The Russian military base in reality, militarily insignificant, is much more political deterrent. But the most disturbing is that that’s the only Russian base anywhere in the former Soviet Union that the local government has to pay for the water, the electricity, the telephone. It is indication how unbalanced Armenia has become, as potentially as Russia’s garrison, vassal state. That is the danger. I do believe that there is a lot more room and flexibility for Armenia to deepen ties with EU, NATO and West than Armenia realizes. How much has Russia really offered, how much Russia is really giving to Armenia? Not very much. Armenia has generally for many years now mortgaged its national security. And the other important thing is that the reason, there is an opportunity, because the Caucasus is now not a zero sum game, where one side wins, one side loses. No, it has to been within the U.S.-Russian strategic partnership. So, that is lot more opportunity for U.S. and Russia to cooperate and less opportunity to compete.
But one thing we have to recognize: the U.S. is far away and always will be far away. Russia is very close and always will be close. So we will always have a relationship with Russia, it is only a question of balancing.
– Can the probable membership of Turkey to EU make Ankara lift blockade from Armenia?
– Turkey within the EU is only good for Armenia in many ways – economically, by bringing EU borders to Armenia, politically, by imposing changes on Turkey, the third way we never talk about – military is most significant. Turkey within the EU significantly reduces military threat to Armenia. Now, if we look at the Armenian-Turkish relations, the biggest problem Turkey has is that Ankara-Yerevan relationship its not really completely free to be determined in Ankara or Yerevan, it is hostage, prisoner to Baku. In other words, Turkey made strategic mistake by making its policy towards Armenia hostage to its relationship with Baku over NK. That limits Turkey’s options. If we look closely, the Turkish-Azerbaijani relations are declining and that is necessary ingredient, precondition for an improvement relations with Armenia. Turkey is changing. Turkey is looking toward Europe, the West. It is much better for Armenia than Turkey looking toward the East. If Turkey get frustrated or rejected by the EU, it will return to Pan-Turkic ideology, which is much more dangerous for Armenia.
Interview by Tatoul Hakobian
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