Thoughts on Turkish-Armenian relations following the latest visit from
Armenian foreign minister
By Mahmut Niyazi Sezgin
(ASAM) Center For Eurasian Strategic Studies, Caucasian Studies Department
Turkish Daily News
Sunday July 21, 2002
In the last few years, there have been efforts to reconcile Turkey and
Armenia and to reinstate formal relations, which were suspended in 1992. The
“Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission” initiative, recent meetings
between the foreign ministers of the two countries, conferences sponsored by
different international institutions, efforts devoted both to the solution
of the Karabagh conflict and the normalization of relations between Turkey
and Armenia, especially after the U.S. military settlement in the Caucasus,
have been high on the political agenda. Although a dialogue has begun and
continues between the parties, the rhetoric and demands of the two sides are
still tremendously different. In this respect, one should take into account
the striking statements made by Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanyan at
a conference on June 25, while he was in Istanbul for the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation meeting:
“Deep cultural, historical and social ties have come into being between
Turks and Armenians, who have lived together for more than a millennium. It
is natural that there are some problems in such a relationship that has deep
roots in history. Yet, the historical ties between Turks and Armenians are
powerful enough to overcome those difficulties. The main problem in the
relationship between Turkey and Armenia today is the pressure that
Azerbaijan exerts on Turkey over the Karabagh conflict. The Karabagh
conflict is not an issue of Turkish foreign politics and thus, shouldn’t be
an obstacle to Turkish-Armenian relations. However, today, Turkish-Armenian
relations have become hostage to the foreign politics of a third party,
namely Azerbaijan. Under pressure from Azerbaijan, Turkey has closed down
its borders with Armenia for 10 years. But what was expected from this
border closure didn’t materialize, the Armenian economy has stood firmly
against this policy. Accordingly, Turkey must abandon this policy and reopen
the borders.”
Frankly speaking, it seems that Mr. Oskanyan is mistaken or misleading on a
few points. First of all, one should mention that Azerbaijan is not the
third but the first party in Turkish-Armenian relations. While repeatedly
stressing how deep and strong the historical and cultural relations between
Turkey and Armenia are, the minister ignores the positions of Azerbaijan and
Turkey with respect to the same qualities, and more. On the other hand, it
should not be forgotten that the understanding, formulized as “one nation,
two states” and declared at the presidential level, is not just a political
slogan that expresses the national sensitivity, but is also an expression of
a reality that comprises geopolitical and strategic meaning.
Secondly, the minister is also mistaken in his claim that the Karabagh
conflict is not an issue for Turkish foreign politics. That Azerbaijan’s
territorial integrity remains intact is of critical importance for both the
political balances in the region and for Turkey. The situation must be dealt
with cautiously — if an ethnic problem is solved through territorial
compromise in the Caucasus, where more than 40 ethnic groups live together
and where there are numerous political problems based on ethnic discord,
this situation may lead the region into an endless crisis. For this reason,
the Karabagh conflict is a vital issue for regional stability, for its
reflections on Turkey and for Turkey’s strategic interests in the region.
At this point, a short insight into the Karabagh issue may be useful.
Armenia’s approach toward the solution of the Karabagh conflict has been to
claim that Karabagh is historical Armenian territory, for the legal
recognition of the de facto situation gained through military achievement
supported from outside. This understanding is erroneous from two
perspectives. I leave aside the claim that Karabagh is historical Armenian
land, although the United Nations declared it to be part of Azerbaijan. The
essential mistake is that an expansionist policy could be legitimized
through historical claims. Let’s say Karabagh is genuine historical Armenian
land. Does this fact give Armenia the right to violate the territorial
integrity of its neighbor? Will Armenia continue to demonstrate this
aggressive stance toward the lands that it declares it has an historical
claim to, namely the east of Turkey and the south of Georgia? Policy makers
in Armenia should take into consideration that if Turkey had moved with the
same logic, Armenia would find itself in a more difficult position, since
Armenians, throughout history, have never established their own independent
state and have lived as citizens of successive Turkish states for the last
1,000 years.
Thirdly, Oskanyan is also mistaken or misleading in his effort to point to
Azerbaijan as the source of problems between Turkey and Armenia. Reality
shows us that there are structural problems in Turkish-Armenian relations
and that they stem from Armenia’s national foreign policy toward Turkey and
from the international policies that it pursues. Most simply, Armenia must
explain why it hesitates to renew its border treaty with Turkey, which
recognizes Turkish territorial unity. Oskanyan, by proclaiming Azerbaijan as
the major obstacle in Turkish-Armenian relations, applies a cleverly
organized psychological operation aimed at destroying the geopolitical front
against it and to make Turkey and Azerbaijan fight with each other.
Oskanyan’s words, at a time when efforts to settle the Karabagh conflict
have intensified, clearly indicates that the timing is not coincidental. An
Azerbaijan that has lost Turkey’s support and remains alone in the
international arena would ease the operations of Armenian irredentism. In
this regard, it should be remembered that no one can bear the geopolitical
consequences of a possible deterioration of relations between Azerbaijan and
Turkey.
Fourthly, and maybe the most interesting part of the foreign minister’s
speech, were his words on Armenia’s present economic situation and the
reopening of borders between Turkey and Armenia. A short glance at the
Armenian economy would make it easier to understand what Oskanyan meant;
while the Armenian economy has recovered significantly vis-a-vis its
performance in the mid-1990s, the current GDP is still about 70 percent of
its pre-independence level. Unemployment rates have reached 25-30 percent
and, 55 percent of the population still lives below the poverty line.
Pervasive corruption is the greatest problem in Armenia, both politically
and economically. Excess interference in business activities by poorly paid
government officials has considerably increased the costs of doing business
and has made it difficult to attract new entries, including the FDI.
Investments are constrained by the high internal and the external political
risks. Emigration, particularly among the young and educated segments of
society, continues at a fast pace. The population has plummeted, from 3.8
million in 1990 to around 2 million at present.
An outdated nuclear power plant operating in a seismic zone, as well as many
other environmental problems, threaten not only Turkey, but other countries
in the region as well. Moreover, according to a claim raised at the Council
of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, Armenia has biological weapons, which
are the direct cause of some of the environmental problems. Armenia cannot
afford to pay its debts to Russia in cash, and therefore gives its state
owned enterprises to Russian firms instead. Serious energy issues are a
chronic problem for the Armenian economy. Meanwhile, against all these
economic indicators, Armenia still assigns 20-25 percent of its state budget
to military expenditures.
However, there are other elements that support the lack of production in the
Armenian economy. Armenia is one of the highest per capita recipients of
loans from international financial institutions. Those loans are part grant
and part very long-term credit with low interest rates. Besides this,
transfers from workers abroad, especially from Russia and from diasporas are
economically significant, such that transfers from Russia in 2001 exceeded
$300 million — about 15 percent of the GDP. Transfers from diasporas are
similarly high. For example, in 2000, Kirk Kirkorian, an American
businessman of Armenian origin, gave grants of about $160 million, which
constituted nearly 9 percent of the national output. In light of these
indicators, the revelations of the Armenian government that the GDP in 2001
grew by 9.6 percent are not valuable at all in economic terms. As clearly
seen, a small economy such as that of Armenia can grow about 9 percent
through the grants of just one businessman.
Conclusion
We are in a period of fragile balances in the Caucasus. At such a time,
Turkey has to attach importance to regional developments more than ever.
First of all, in the Karabagh conflict, a victory for expansionism and a
disrespect for territorial integrity must be avoided. Otherwise, no one can
predict what results the ensuing security problem will bring about in the
region. Armenia’s irrational foreign policy may lead to a strict
confrontation between Turkey and Russia, which has military bases in Armenia
and patrols the country’s Turkish and Iranian borders. This is not a
situation either country wants.
The conditions that Turkey stipulates for the normalization of relations
with Armenia are quite logical. No country desires to have normal relations
with a country that does not recognize its territorial integrity. Armenia
must, first of all, sign a border treaty recognizing Turkey’s territorial
unity; contribute to the peaceful resolution of the Karabagh conflict, in
accordance with the principle of territorial integrity and equity, and thus
help one million refugees return home; abandon the worldwide genocide
campaign; and, if it really wants to permanently normalize relations with
Turkey, remove the genocide claim from its constitution and its educational
agenda, which condition the minds of Armenian children of school age with
Turkish enmity, and so mortgages the future of Turkish-Armenian relations.
Turkey must declare its rightful position in these issues, to both the
domestic and the international public. If Turkey establishes relations with
Armenia, which would be understood as a compromise against these policies,
the political elite, which follows this path in Armenia, would strengthen
their hands, both within the country and abroad. Such a response would be a
heavy defeat for a sound and sustainable reconciliation and dialogue.
Finally, the Armenian minister believes that Armenia can establish normal
diplomatic relations with Turkey by covering up these clear facts and by
directing influential international pressure on Turkey, by means of
proclaiming Turkey’s blockade responsible for the economic decline in
Armenia. Turkey is not responsible for Armenia’s economic collapse, and
hence Turkey does not need to compensate for Armenia’s losses.
Armenia must first criticize itself as a major factor impeding the
development of a region which has the potential for fast economic growth. It
was the Armenian administration itself that, after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, drove an economically self-insufficient country with a
economic structure that has collapsed due to an unrighteous war and war
economy; exacerbated its relations with almost all neighboring countries
with a political philosophy contradictory to all contemporary political
values; endangered the investment climate by contributing to the existing
and potential political uncertainties and risks, both from domestic
political instability and from the war over the Karabagh region of
Azerbaijan, bringing investments to a halt; led to the emigration of its
young and educated people, the number of whom according to the most
optimistic estimations is about 1 million; and recklessly spent all the
money transferred from the diasporas and international financial
institutions, instead of creating with it new employment opportunities.
Armenia must face up to its post-independence history with regard to the
sociopolitical and economic environment in the country, the position that it
came to take regarding Caucasian geopolitics, and the progress of relations
with Turkey — the presidential and parliamentary elections that will take
place in March 2003 may be the perfect opportunity.
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