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Spurned by the West, Turkey Looks Eastward

By Suat Kiniklioglu

ANKARA—In 2002, when Tuncer Kilinc, the secretary general of Turkey’s powerful National Security Council, said that the country should abandon its efforts to become a member of the European Union and turn toward its regional neighbors Russia and Iran, few Turks took him seriously.

Four years later, Kilinc’s proposition does not look so far-fetched. According to the Transatlantic Trends 2006 survey co-sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Turks feel twice as warm toward Iran as they do toward the United States. Equally, Turkish feelings toward the EU have experienced sharp declines.

So what has happened in the last four years to precipitate such a dramatic turnaround in Turkish public perceptions? After all, Iran is a Shiite country that is run by Islamic law and has little in common with Turkey’s predominantly Sunni democracy.

The primary reason behind the sea- change is the post-9/11, “with-us-or- against-us” environment and the trauma inflicted on Turkey by the war in Iraq. In addition, the global rise of identity politics, most aptly signified by the Danish cartoon crisis and increasing instability around Turkey’s borders, have shaken traditionally secular Turks.

The United States invaded Iraq despite strong Turkish opposition at a time when Turkey was about to win the peace with its Kurdish citizens. Then the Turkish Parliament refused to grant the United States the right to invade Iraq from the north, which left bad feelings at the Pentagon.

As events have confirmed Turkey’s grave misgivings about the war, Turks believe the United States has not taken sufficient care to address their security concerns. Indeed, over the last six months, more Turkish soldiers have been killed by the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, than Americans by Iraqi insurgents. Yet the Pentagon has resisted calls to act against the PKK, partly because of grudges held against Turkey.

Turkey’s relationship with the EU has also worsened since December 2004. Since the EU decided to start accession negotiations, Europeans have released an unrelenting barrage of discomfort with potential Turkish membership.

Relations also remain strained over the inability of the EU to find a constructive approach to the Cyprus issue, despite repeated assurances that the isolation of Turkish Cyprus would be lifted.

Many Turks note that Europeans are eager to engage Turkey on energy security, immigration and integration, or peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, but fail to involve Turks when the future of Europe is debated.

While Turkey’s neighborhood becomes more dangerous and its strategic value to the West increases, it is often neglected as a partner. Not surprisingly, Turkish support for EU membership has dropped from 73 percent in 2004 to 54 percent in 2006, according to the Transatlantic Trends survey.

In the past, Turkey could usually rely on the United States when relations with the EU were strained. But this link is now also frayed.

Consequently, silently yet effectively, Turkey is redefining its foreign-policy orientation in view of its newly discovered strategic depth.

The Turkish response to this situation is very much linked to its domestic politics. The rise of the Justice and Development Party in 2002 brought into office a cadre that is willing to engage more directly with the Middle East and the wider Islamic world.

The war in Iraq, Western tensions with Syria and Iran and the war in Lebanon provided ample opportunity for Turkish decision makers to express their new foreign-policy outlook.

Formally, Turkey remains in the Western camp, but it is increasingly the odd man out. In contrast, Turkey’s relations with Russia have developed exponentially. Relations with Iran are also improving. Tehran provides assistance to Ankara’s efforts to fight the PKK and is a significant gas supplier.

While it is still too early to talk about a major shift in Turkey, all the ingredients for a realignment are there. José Manuel Barroso, the European Commission president, recently warned that Europe needs to be very careful about Turkey’s gravitating strategic role on Europe’s borders.

It would be highly desirable if other European leaders acquired similar wisdom. Otherwise there will be little value in blaming each other when we start asking, “Who lost Turkey?”

Suat Kiniklioglu is director of the Ankara office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

International Herald Tribune

September 8, 2006

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