By Richard Giragosian
Special to ArmeniaNow
With elections for a new parliament in May 2007 and a new president in 2008, Armenia is quickly approaching an important turning point in its difficult path toward democracy. The first election will challenge Armenia’s political development, especially following the adoption of key constitutional reforms last November.
9 months till decision time
Both elections pose significant tests for Armenia. And, as political parties and leaders prepare for the parliamentary election, it is clear that the contest will be one of the most important milestones for the future course of the country.
The current parliament, elected in May 2003, reflects an outdated political reality that has been more recently shaped by changes to the composition of the country’s ruling three-party coalition, the emergence of a new political party, and a shift in political alliances and affiliations. Most significant in terms of structural democratic development, the passage of electoral reforms in May 2005 and the subsequent constitutional amendments have each redefined the framework for the coming elections. Thus, in light of the changing political reality and new changes to the system, it seems clear that there will be a very different parliament elected in May 2007.
The present 131-seat Armenian parliament is comprised of 75 seats “proportionally” elected, and 56 seats chosen on the basis of single mandate representation. But the formula for electing a new parliament has changed since the last election.
Most significantly, the reforms increased the number of parliamentary seats to be elected by party list, or proportional system, from 75 to 90, and lowered the number of single-mandate seats elected by majority from 56 to 41. The reforms were seen as a step to help reduce bribery and “vote buying.” Recently, President Kocharyan said that he opposes the “all-proportional” system of representation in parliament, and has indicated his preference for retaining the 41 seats for deputies directly elected from single-mandate constituencies.
Additionally, the amendments also focused on the composition of electoral commissions, and reduced the number of presidential-appointed members of both the Central Electoral Commission and the 56 district commissions from three to one member – a reform aimed at minimizing the potential for undue presidential influence over the nominally independent electoral commissions. Under this revised composition, each electoral commission would now consist of one member nominated by the president, one member named by each of the party factions represented in the parliament and two members appointed from the judiciary.
Further electoral reforms included the creation of a new national database or registry of the country’s eligible voters, and the introduction of more detailed regulations governing the compilation and release of official voting results. Such an improvement was deemed necessary to reduce the delay in releasing official results and, as seen in past elections, to lessen opportunities for vote count tampering. Other reform measures included improvements to the processes of filing and hearing of campaign-related complaints and appeals. Reform also enhanced and expanded the rights of candidate proxies and electoral observer teams in polling stations – a measure especially important for opposition observers and proxies who have been subject to outright intimidation in the past.
In a broader sense, however, the constitutional amendments of last year present deeper and even more relevant implications for political change in Armenia. Specifically, the constitutional amendments forge a more balanced distribution of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. The most notable element of this rebalancing addresses structural changes that end the power of the president to appoint the prime minister; impose a new requirement that the mayor of the Yerevan capital be indirectly elected by an elected municipal council rather than appointed by the president; and replace the presidential appointment of the Council of Justice, with an election by members of the judiciary.
Additionally, access to the country’s highest judicial body, the Armenian Constitutional Court, which interprets and enforces basic law and ensures the constitutionality of legislation, was broadened to provide ordinary citizens with the right to challenge the constitutionality of legal provisions applied against individuals. Without this change, access to the court and the right to challenge the constitutionality of policies or laws was limited to the president, at least one-third of the parliament, and officially registered candidates running in elections.
Against the promise for political change inherent in these reforms, Armenia faces a serious obstacle.
The challenge of the parliamentary election stems from the nature of politics in Armenia, or more specifically, the political will of the ruling elite. The looming question is whether there is a degree of political will that is sufficient to ensure free and fair elections that are crucial to the development of a maturing and improving system of governance. And the danger is that there will only be a degree of political will committed to maintaining power, at the expense of real democratic progress.
Such a challenge of political will can also be seen in the constitutional referendum which, after a heated campaign by the government, and an opposition boycott, was adopted in a vote marred by a dubiously overwhelming margin of victory. Although the passage of the referendum was widely seen as a forgone conclusion, especially given the weight and intensity of the government’s campaign for its passage, the official results sparked widespread skepticism. The results, which reported that the constitutional referendum had been approved by an overwhelming 93.2 percent of some 1.5 million voters, with a voter turnout of 65.4 percent, stood in stark contrast to the media reports and televised coverage of the vote that showed virtually empty polling stations.
What appears by the questionable tally, is that the sole priority for the ruling elite was the result, and not the process. Hopes for a truly free and fair next May were dimmed last November.
The lesson from this political reality is that the adoption of political reforms, no matter how impressive or influential, is not sufficient for real democratic progress in Armenia. What is most significant in Armenia is the political will and commitment to change that is necessary to implement political reform. Therefore, although the election of a new Armenian parliament next spring will undoubtedly reconfigure Armenian politics, real change will remain unrealized unless May does not follow November.
Richard Giragosian is a Washington D.C./Yerevan-based analyst specializing in Caucasus and Asian policy and foreign affairs.
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