By Larry Siedentop
Published: December 15 2004 02:00 | Last updated: December 15 2004 02:00
The European Union is about to make a momentous decision. Should it open formal accession negotiations with Turkey? The question is a fiendishly difficult one.
Many in France (though not President Jacques Chirac) and Germany are adamantly opposed to Turkish entry, especially on cultural grounds. Britain, with the not-too-subtle backing of the US, has been consistently in favour of Turkish entry. Anglo-American motives are geopolitical and economic, though there is an important subtext – namely, that Turkish entry could put an end to any EU hopes of acquiring a stronger, quasi-federal political identity.
What should we think? Some of the arguments put forward to support entry are double-edged. For example, the argument that an integrated, democratic Turkey would provide the EU with a more stable frontier begs the question of whether EU frontiers with Syria, Iraq and Iran would be advantageous. Similarly, the argument that a secular Muslim society could become a beacon for other Muslim countries might be countered by the argument that such a development would only confirm in the minds of many Muslims what the embrace of Europe does to their faith. After all, the fact is that Turkey does not enjoy very good relations with its neighbours to the south-east – with the striking exception of Israel.
What about the cultural question? Here differences between social attitudes in urbanised Turkey and much of Anatolia come to the fore – though substantial migration from the east into Istanbul has arguably weakened secularism, to the advantage of fundamentalism, even there. The status and role of women is only the most obvious issue. So the passionate desire of the Turkish political and administrative class to secure EU entry can be read in two ways – on the one hand, as a deeply civilised concern, and, on the other, as a reflection of their fragile hold over Turkish opinion. When those urging Turkish entry at times raise the prospect of dire internal consequences should entry be denied or long postponed, they do as much to raise doubts as dispel them.
Paradoxically, the rise of multi culturalism in Europe has made it more difficult to discuss issues raised by cultural differences. In part, this is because exploring such differences may lead to intractable questions of religious belief or incompatible moral intuitions deriving from religious belief. But the difficulty also springs from a liberal mindset, which gives a strange afterlife to Marxism. That is, in our thinking about policy we tend to move between economic matters and legal provisions, without giving enough attention to the shaping of popular attitudes and habits – to what the French call moeurs.
Two recent examples spring to mind. The condition of Germany today makes clear that not enough thought was given at reunification to the cultural differences that nearly 50 years of separation had created. Hefty spending and legal change were relied upon to do what was needed. The same weakness can be detected in Anglo-American thinking about the “democratisation” of post-invasion Iraq.
How do these considerations apply to the Turkish question? They suggest that the Copenhagen criteria for judging the readiness of a country for formal candidacy should not be applied too narrowly. The rule of law and civil liberty, the autonomy of civil society and independence of the judiciary, are not just formal attributes of public institutions. To be the attributes of a free, self-governing society – which I take to be the goal of the EU – they must have deep roots in public opinion.
If the imminent meeting of EU leaders decides to open the formal process of Turkish admission, then in all fairness to Turkey it should be made clear that there is a final, over-arching criterion for entry. The EU has to be satisfied that secularism and civil liberty rest not just on a state apparatus backed by military force, but also on public opinion.
It is pointless to worry about whether the EU will be perceived as a “Christian club”. That is not the issue. In Islamic countries with regimes widely deemed to be moderate – Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan and Indonesia – there is a disturbing correlation between secularism and the role of military power. As a self-governing association of nation-states, the EU cannot afford to take risks with its very raison d’être. Civil liberty and political liberty must be judged to be inseparable.
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